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Introduction 
The  rise  of  Milton  Friedman’s  version  of  mone- 
tarism  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s  provoked  an 
antimonetarist  backlash  culminating  in  the  late 
Nicholas  Kaldor’s The Scourge  of Monetarism  (1982). 
Friedman  stressed  the  ideas  of  exogenous  (i.e., 
central  bank  determined)  money,  money-to-price 
causality,  inflation  as a monetary  phenomenon,  and 
controllability  of  money  through  the  high-powered 
monetary  base.  He  traced  a chain  of causation  run- 
ning  from  open  market  operations  to  bank  reserves 
to the  nominal  stock  of money  and  thence  to  aggre- 
gate  spending,  nominal  income,  and  prices. 
By contrast,  Kaldor postulated  the  opposite  notions 
of  endogenous  (i.e.,  demand-determined)  money, 
reverse  causality,  and  inflation  as  a  cost-push  or 
supply-shock  phenomenon.  He  denied  the  possibility 
of  base  control  given  the  central  bank’s  responsi- 
bility  to  guarantee  bank  liquidity  and  the  financial 
sector’s  ability  to  engineer  changes  in  the  turnover 
velocity  of  money  via  the  manufacture  of  money 
substitutes.  Kaldor’s  transmission  mechanism  runs 
from  wages  (and  other  factor  costs)  to  prices  to 
money  and  thence  to  bank  reserves.  Wages  deter- 
mine  prices,  prices  influence  loan demands,  and loan 
demands  via their  accommodation  in the  form  of new 
checking  deposits  created  by  commercial  banks 
determine  the  money  stock,  with  central  banks 
passively  supplying  the  necessary  reserves. 
Kaldor  claimed  his  attack  on  monetarism  was  in 
the  tradition  of Keynes’s  General Theory. So much  so 
that  he  labeled  it  “a  Keynesian  perspective  on 
money.  ” In so doing,  he contributed  to the  standard 
textbook  tendency  to  treat  the  monetarist- 
antimonetarist  debate  as a post-Keynesian  develop- 
ment.  This  article  shows  that  the  debate  long 
predates  Keynes,  that  it  is  rooted  in  classical 
monetary  tradition,  and  that  it  traces  back  at  least 
to  the  bullionist-antibullionist  and  currency  school- 
banking  school  disputes  in England  in the  nineteenth 
century.  More  precisely,  the  following  paragraphs 
demonstrate  that  the  arguments  of  Friedman  and 
Kaldor  were  fully  anticipated  by  their  classical 
predecessors. 
Bullionist  Controversy  (1797-1821) 
Monetarism  did not  begin  with  Friedman  nor  did 
antimonetarism  originate  with  Kaldor  or  Keynes’s 
General Theory. Those  doctrines  clashed  as early  as 
the  Bank  Restriction  period  of the  Napoleonic  wars 
when  the  Bank  of England  suspended  the  converti- 
bility  of  its  notes  into  gold  at  a  fixed  price  on  de- 
mand.  The  suspension  of specie  payments  and  the 
resulting  move  to  inconvertible  paper  was followed 
by  a rise  in the  paper  pound  price  of commodities, 
gold  bullion,  and  foreign  currencies.  A  debate  be- 
tween  strict  bullionists,  moderate  bullionists,  and an- 
tibullionists  then  arose  over  the  question:  Was there 
inflation  in  England  and  if so  what  was  its  cause? 
Strict  Bullionists:  the  classical  monetarists 
Led  by David  Ricardo,  the  strict  bullionists  argued 
that  inflation  did  exist,  that  overissue  of banknotes 
by  the  Bank  of England  was the  cause,  and  that  the 
premium  on gold  (the  difference  between  the  market 
and  official  mint  price  of  gold  in  terms  of  paper 
money)  together  with  the  pound’s  depreciation  on 
the  foreign  exchange  constituted  the  proof.  Price 
index  numbers  not  then  being  in  general  use,  the 
bullionists  used  the  gold  premium  and  depreciated 
exchange  rate  to  measure  inflation. 
The  bullionists  arrived  at their  conclusions  via the 
following  route:  The  Bank of England  determines  the 
quantity  of  inconvertible  paper  money.  The  quan- 
tity  of  money  via  its  impact  on  aggregate  spending 
determines  domestic  prices.  Domestic  prices,  given 
foreign  prices,  determine  the  exchange  rate  so as to 
equalize  worldwide  the  common-currency  price  of 
goods.  Finally,  the  exchange  rate  between  incon- 
vertible  paper  and  gold  standard  currencies  deter- 
mines  the  paper  premium  on specie  so as to equalize 
everywhere  the gold price  of goods.  In short,  causality 
runs  unidirectionally  from  money  to prices  to the  ex- 
change  rate and  the  gold  premium.  It followed  that 
the  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  below  gold 
parity  (i.e.,  below  the  ratio  of  the  respective  mint 
prices  of  gold  in  each  country)  together  with  the 
premium  on  specie  constituted  evidence  that  prices 
were  higher  and  the  quantity  of  money  greater  in 
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vertibility  reigned.  Here  is a straightforward  applica- 
tion  of  the  monetarist  ideas  of  exogenous  money, 
money-to-price  causality,  inflation  as  a  monetary 
phenomenon,  and purchasing  power  parity.  On these 
grounds  the  strict  bullionists  attributed  depreciation 
of  the  internal  and  external  value  of  the  pound 
solely  to  the  redundancy  of money  and  reproached 
the  Bank  for  having  taken  advantage  of the  suspen- 
sion  of  convertibility  to  overissue  the  currency. 
The  strict bullionists  also enunciated  the  monetarist 
notion  of  control  of  the  money  stock  through  the 
high-powered  monetary  base.  With  respect  to  base 
control,  they  argued  that  the  Bank  of England  could, 
through  its  own  note  issue,  regulate  the  note  issue 
of the  country  (non-London)  banks  as well  as other 
privately  issued  means  of payment  (bills of exchange 
and  checking  deposits).  Two  circumstances,  they 
said,  worked  to  ensure  base  controllability.  First, 
country  banks  tended  to  hold  in  reserve  Bank  of 
England  notes  (or  balances  with  London  agents 
transferable  into  such  notes)  equal  to a relatively  fixed 
fraction  of  their  own  note  liabilities.  This  estab- 
lished  a constant  relationship  between  the  Bank  note 
base  and  the  country  note  component  of the  money 
stock.  Second,  a fixed-exchange-rate  regional  balance 
of  payments  or  specie-flow  mechanism  kept  coun- 
try  bank  notes  in  line  with  the  Bank’s  own  issues. 
Country  bank  notes  were  fully convertible  into  Bank 
of  England  notes  but  did  not  circulate  in  London. 
Should  country  banks  overissue,  the  resulting  rise 
in local  prices  over  London  prices  would  lead  to  a 
demand  to  convert  local  currency  into  Bank  of 
England  notes  to  make  cheaper  purchases  in  Lon- 
don.  The  ensuing  drain  on  reserves  would  force 
country  banks  to  contract  their  note  issue,  thus 
eliminating  the  excess.  For  these  reasons,  the  quan- 
tity  of  country  notes  was  tied  by  a rigid  link  to  the 
volume  of  Bank  notes  and  could  only  expand  and 
contract  with  the  latter.  The  implication  was  clear: 
Bank  of England  notes  drove  the  entire  money  stock. 
Country  banks  were  exonerated  as  a  source  of 
inflation. 
The  strict  bullionists  displayed  another  monetarist 
trait  in  prescribing  rules  rather  than  discretion  in 
the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  Their  rule  called 
for  the  Bank  of  England  to  contract  its  note  issue 
upon  the  first  sign  of exchange  depreciation  or  rise 
in  the  price  of  gold.  This  rule  derived  from  the 
famous Ricardian definition  of excess  according  to which 
if the  exchange  was  depreciated  and  gold  was  com- 
manding  a premium  the  currency  was  by  definition 
excessive  and  should  be  contracted. 
Moderate  Bullionists 
Moderate  bullionists,  led  by  Henry  Thornton, 
Thomas  Malthus,  and  William  Blake,  modified  the 
strict  bullionists’  analysis  in one  respect:  they  argued 
that  it applied  to the  long  run  but  not  necessarily  to 
the  short.  They  held  that  in the  short  run  real as well 
as monetary  shocks  could  affect  the  exchange  rate 
such  that  temporary  depreciation  did  not  neces- 
sarily  signify  monetary  overissue.  In  the  long  run, 
however,  real  shocks  were  self-correcting  and  only 
monetary  disturbances  remained.  Their  position  is 
best  exemplified  by  Blake’s  distinction  between  the 
real and  nominal  exchanges.  The  real  exchange  or 
barter  terms  of  trade,  he  said,  registers  the  impact 
of nonmonetary  disturbances-crop  failures,  unilateral 
transfers,  trade  embargoes  and  the  like-to  the 
balance  of payments.  By  contrast,  the  nominal  ex- 
change  reflects  the  relative  purchasing  powers  of 
foreign  and  domestic  currencies  as  determined  by 
their  relative  supplies.  Both  components  contribute 
to exchange  rate  movements  in the  short  run.  In the 
long run,  however,  the  real exchange  is self-correcting 
(i.e.,  returns  to  its  natural  equilibrium  level)  and 
only  the  nominal  exchange  can  remain  permanently 
depressed.  Therefore,  persistent  exchange  deprecia- 
tion  is  a  sure  sign  of  monetary  overissue.  On  this 
point  the  moderate  bullionists  agreed  with  their  strict 
bullionist  colleagues. 
Antibullionists:  the  classical  nonmonetarists 
Opposed  to the  bullionists  were  the  antibullionist 
defenders  of the  Bank  of England.  They  denied  that 
the  Bank  had  overissued  or that  domestic  monetary 
policy  had  anything  to  do  with  the  depreciating 
exchange  rate  and  rising  price  of  gold.  Such  infla- 
tionary  symptoms  they  attributed  to real rather  than 
monetary  causes.  In so doing,  they  contributed  two 
key  ideas  that  today  appear  in  Kaldor’s  work. 
First  was  their  supply-shock  or  cost-push  theory 
of inflation.  They  argued  that  crop  failures  and  war- 
time  disturbances  to foreign trade  had raised  the  price 
of wheat  and other  staple  foodstuffs  that  constituted 
the  main  component  of  workers’  budgets.  These 
price  increases  then  passed  through  into  money 
wages  and  thus  raised  the  price  of  all  goods  pro- 
duced  by  labor.  Ricardo,  however,  convincingly 
replied  that  this  explanation  confused  relative  with 
absolute  prices.  For  without  excessive  money  growth, 
a  rise  in  the  relative  price  of  wheat  that  required 
workers  to  spend  more  on  that  commodity  would 
leave  them  with  less to  spend  on other  goods  whose 
prices  would  accordingly  fall.  In  that  case  the  rise 
in wheat’s price  would  be offset  by compensating  falls 
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unchanged. 
Second,  the  antibullionists  enunciated  the  notion 
of an endogenous,  demand-determined  money  stock. 
This  came  in the form  of their  real bills doctrine, which 
they  employed  to  assert  the  impossibility  of  an ex- 
cess  supply  of  money  ever  developing  to  spill  over 
into  the  commodity  market  to  put  upward  pressure 
on  prices.  The  real  bills  doctrine  states  that  money 
can  never  be  excessive  if issued  upon  the  discount 
of  sound,  short-term  commercial  bills  drawn  to 
finance  real  goods  in the  process  of production  and 
distribution.  It purports  to match  money  creation  with 
real  output  so  that  no  inflation  occurs. 
The  antibullionists  used  this  idea  to  defend  the 
Bank  of  England  against  the  charge  that  it  had 
caused  inflation  through  overissue.  The  Bank,  they 
said,  was  blameless  since  it had  restricted  its issues 
to  real  bills  of  exchange  and  so  had  merely  re- 
sponded  to  the  real  needs  of trade.  In other  words, 
the  Bank,  by  limiting  its  advances  to  commercial 
paper  representing  actual  output,  had  merely 
responded  to  a loan  demand  for  money  already  in 
existence  and had done  nothing  inflationary  to create 
that  demand. 
The  real  bills  doctrine  was  an  early  version  of 
Kaldor’s  notion  that  a passive,  demand-determined 
money  stock  cannot  be  overissued  and  so  cannot 
cause  inflation.  Antibullionists  also anticipated  Kaldor 
in arguing  that  since  no one  would  borrow  at interest 
money  not  needed,  the  Bank  could  not  force  an ex- 
cess  issue  on  the  market.  Such  excess,  they  said, 
would  be speedily  extinguished  as borrowers  returned 
it  to  the  Bank  to  pay  off  costly  loans.  In  short,  the 
antibullionists  held  that  the  Bank  could  not  cause 
inflation  since  it merely  supplied  money  passively  in 
response  to  a loan  demand  for  it. Thus  there  could 
be  no  excess  issue  to  spill over  into  the  commodity 
market  in the  form  of  an  excess  demand  for  goods 
to  bid  up  prices. 
Critique  of  the  Real  Bills  Doctrine 
Monetarists  today  criticize  Kaldor’s  notion  of  a 
transmission  mechanism  running  unidirectionally 
from  wages  to prices  to money  for ignoring  the  feed- 
back  effect  of  money  on  prices.  Adding  this  feed- 
back  loop  produces  a two-way  interaction  in which 
prices  and  money  can  chase  each  other  upward  ad 
infinitum  in  a  self-reinforcing  inflationary  spiral. 
Monetarists  argue  that  such  a spiral  is sure  to  result 
if banks,  in passively  creating  new money  in response 
to  loan  demands  for  it,  set  the  loan  rate  of  interest 
below  the  expected  rate  of profit  on  the  use  of the 
borrowed  funds.  In  this  case  loan  demands  will be 
insatiable  and  the  resulting  rise  in money  and  prices 
will  be  without  limit. 
Bullionists,  especially  Henry  Thornton,  advanced 
exactly  this same  argument  against  the  antibullionists’ 
real  bills  doctrine.  That  doctrine,  they  said,  suffers 
from  two  basic  flaws.  First,  it  links  the  nominal 
money  stock  with  the  nominal  volume  of  bills,  a 
variable  that  moves  in step  with  prices  and  thus  the 
money  stock  itself.  In  so  doing  it  renders  both 
variables  indeterminate.  It  thus  ensures  that  any 
inadvertant  jump  in  money  and  prices  will,  by 
raising  the  nominal  value  of goods  in the  process  of 
production  and  hence  the  nominal  quantity  of bills 
eligible  for  discount,  lead  to  further  increases  in 
money  and  prices  ad  infinitum  in  a  self-justifying 
inflationary  spiral.  Second,  it  overlooks  that  the 
demand  for loans  and volume  of bills offered  for dis- 
count  depend  not  so  much  on  real  output  to  be 
financed  as on the  perceived  profitability  of borrow- 
ing as indicated  by  the  differential  between  the  loan 
rate  of interest  and  the  expected  rate  of profit  on the 
use  of  the  borrowed  funds.  In  particular,  it  fails  to 
see  that  when  the  profit  rate  exceeds  the  loan  rate 
the  demand  for loans  becomes  insatiable  and the  real 
bills  criterion  fails to  limit  the  quantity  of money  in 
existence. 
This  last flaw, bullionists  argued,  rendered  the  real 
bills  doctrine  an  especially  dangerous  policy  guide 
under  inconvertibility.  To  be sure,  even  under  specie 
convertibility  a central  bank  that  set  its loan  rate  too 
low  relative  to  the  expected  profit  rate  would  find 
itself  inundated  with  a potentially  unlimited  supply 
of  eligible  bills  clamoring  for  discount.  But  the 
resulting  rise  in  money  and  prices  would,  by 
making  home  goods  dearer  than  foreign  ones,  lead 
to a trade  deficit  and a matching  gold drain that would 
force  the  bank  to  protect  its  metallic  reserves  by 
raising  its loan  rate  thereby  ending  the  inflation.  No 
such  result  was  assured  under  paper  currency 
regimes,  however.  For  without  the  crucial  check  of 
convertibility,  the  profit  rate-loan  rate  differential 
could  persist  indefinitely  and  with  it  the  self- 
reinforcing  rise  in  money,  prices,  and  commercial 
bills.  This  point  was  particularly  telling  during  the 
suspension  period  when  usury  ceilings  constrained 
the  Bank  of  England’s  lending  rate  to  5 percent  at 
a time  when  the  expected  profit  rate,  buoyed  by the 
boom  conditions  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  was  well 
in  excess  of  that  level. 
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(1821-1845) 
Monetarist  and  antimonetarist  doctrines  clashed 
again  in  the  three  decades  following  the  Bank  of 
England’s  restoration  of the  gold  convertibility  of its 
notes  in  1821.  This  time  the  debate  focused  on how 
to protect  the  currency  from  overissue  so as to secure 
the  gold  reserve  and ensure  the  maintenance  of con- 
vertibility.  The  protagonists  in  this  dispute  were 
known  collectively  as the  currency  school  and  the 
banking  school,  but  they  were  the  intellectual  heirs 
of the  bullionists  and  antibullionists.  Leaders  of the 
currency  school  included  such names  as Samuel Jones 
Loyd  (Lord  Overstone),  George  Warde  Norman,  and 
Robert  Torrens.  Similarly,  Thomas  Tooke,  John 
Fullarton,  James  Wilson,  and  J.B.  Gilbart  led  the 
banking  school. 
The  currency  school’s  bullionist  predecessors  had 
assumed  that  a convertible  currency  needed  no pro- 
tection.  If the  currency  were  convertible,  they  rea- 
soned,  any excess  issue  of notes  which  raised  British 
prices  relative  to  foreign  prices  would  be  converted 
into  gold  to  make  cheaper  purchases  abroad.  The 
resulting  loss of specie  reserves  would  force  the  Bank 
immediately  to  contract  its  note  issue  thus  quickly 
arresting  the  drain and restoring  the  money  stock  and 
prices  to their  preexisting  equilibrium  levels.  Given 
smooth  and  rapid  adjustment  (monetary  self- 
correction)  convertibility  was  its  own  safeguard. 
A series of monetary  crises  in the  1820s  and  1830s, 
however,  convinced  the  currency  school  that  adjust- 
ment  was far from  smooth  and that  convertibility  per 
se  was  not  a guaranteed  safeguard  to  overissue.  It 
was  an  inadequate  safeguard  because  it  allowed 
banks-commercial  and  central-too  much  discre- 
tion  in  the  management  of  their  note  issue.  Banks 
could  and  did  continue  to  issue  notes  even  as gold 
was  flowing  out,  delaying  contraction  until  the  last 
possible  minute,  and then  contracting  with  a violence 
that  sent  shock  waves  throughout  the  economy. 
Currency  School’s  Prescription 
What  was  needed,  the  currency  school  thought, 
was  a law removing  the  note  issue  from  the  discre- 
tion  of bankers  and  placing  it under  strict  regulation. 
To  be effective,  this  law should  require  the  banking 
system  to  contract  its  note  issue  one-for-one  with 
outflows  of gold  so as to put  a gradual  and  early  stop 
to specie  drains.  Such  a law would  embody  the  cur- 
rency  school’s principle  of metallic fluctuation  accord- 
ing  to  which  a  mixed  currency  of  paper  and  coin 
should  be  made  to  behave  exactly  as  if  it  were 
wholly  metallic,  automatically  expanding  and  con- 
tracting  to  match  inflows  and  outflows  of  gold. 
Departure  from  this rule,  the  currency  school  argued, 
would  permit  persistent  overissue  of paper,  forcing 
an efflux  of specie  through  the  balance  of payments, 
which  in  turn  would  endanger  the  gold  reserve, 
threaten  gold  convertibility,  compel  the  need  for 
sharp  contraction,  and  thereby  precipitate  financial 
panics.  Such  panics  would  be  exacerbated  if inter- 
nal  gold  drains  coincided  with  external  ones  as 
moneyholders,  alarmed  by the  possibility  of suspen- 
sion,  sought  to convert  paper  currency  into  gold.  No 
such  consequences  would  ensue,  however,  if  the 
currency  conformed  to  the  metallic  principle. 
Forced  to  behave  like  gold  (regarded  by  the  cur- 
rency  school  as the  stablest  of monetary  standards) 
the  currency  would  be spared  those  sharp  procyclical 
fluctuations  in quantity  that  constitute  a prime  source 
of  economic  disturbance. 
The  currency  school  scored  a triumph  when  its 
ideas  were  enacted  into  law.  The  Bank  Charter  Act 
of  1844  embodied  its  prescription  that,  except  for 
a  small  fixed  fiduciary  issue,  Bank  notes  were  to 
be  backed  by  an identical  amount  of gold  while  the 
country  bank  note  issue  was frozen  at its  1842  level. 
In  modern  terminology,  the  Act  effectively  estab- 
lished  a marginal  gold  reserve  requirement  of  100 
percent  behind  note  issues.  With  notes  tied  to  gold 
in  this  fashion,  their  volume  would  start  to  shrink 
as  soon  as  specie  drains  signaled  the  earliest  ap- 
pearance  of  overissue.  Monetary  overexpansion 
would  be  corrected  automatically  before  it could  do 
much  damage. 
Banking  School 
The  rival  banking  school  flatly  rejected  the  cur- 
rency  school’s prescription  of mandatory  100 percent 
gold  cover  for  notes.  Indeed,  the  banking  school 
denied  the  need  for statutory  note  control  of any kind, 
arguing that  a convertible  note  issue was automatically 
regulated  by  the  needs  of trade  and  required  no  fur- 
ther  limitation.  This  conclusion  stemmed  directly 
from  the  real  bills  doctrine  and law of reflux,  which 
the  banking  school  took  from  the  antibullionists  and 
applied  to  convertible  currency  regimes. 
The  school’s  real  bills  doctrine  stated  that  money 
could  never  be  excessive  if issued  on  loans  made  to 
finance  real transactions  in goods  and  services.  Simi- 
larly  the  law  of  reflux  asserted  that  overissue  was 
impossible  because  any  excess  notes  would  be 
returned  instantaneously  to  the  banks  for  conver- 
sion  into  coin  or for  repayment  of loans.  Both  doc- 
trines  embodied  the  notions  of  a passive,  demand- 
determined  money  supply  and  of  reverse  causality 
running  from  economic  activity  and prices  to money 
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According  to  the  reverse  causality  hypothesis, 
changes  in the  level  of prices  and production  induce 
corresponding  shifts  in  the  demand  for  bank  loans 
which  the  banks  accommodate  via variations  in the 
note  issue.  In this way prices  help  determine  the  note 
component  of  the  money  stock,  the  expansion  of 
which  is the  result,  not  the  cause,  of price  inflation. 
As  for  the  price  level  itself,  the  banking  school 
attributed  its determination  to factor  incomes  or costs 
(wages,  interest,  rents,  etc.)  thus  establishing  the 
essentials  of a cost-push  theory  of inflation.  The  im- 
portance  of the  cost-push  idea to the  banking  school 
cannot  be  overestimated:  it even  led Thomas  Tooke 
to  argue  that  high-interest-rate  tight-money  policies 
were  inflationary  since  they  raised  the  interest  com- 
ponent  of  business  costs. 
Antimonetarist  Ideas 
The  concepts  of  cost  inflation,  reverse  causality 
and  passive  money  are  the  hallmarks  of an extreme 
antimonetarist  view  of  the  monetary  transmission 
mechanism  to which  the  banking  school  adhered.  Its 
list of antimonetarist  ideas  also included  the  proposi- 
tions  (1)  that  international  gold  movements  are 
absorbed  by and released  from  idle hoards  and  have 
no  effect  on  the  volume  of  money  in  circulation, 
(2)  that  an  efflux  of  specie  stems  from  real  shocks 
to  the  balance  of payments  and  not  from  domestic 
price  inflation,  (3) that  changes  in the  stock  of money 
tend  to  be  offset  by  compensating  changes  in  the 
stock  of money  substitutes  leaving  the  total  circula- 
tion  unchanged,  and  (4)  that  discretion  is superior 
to  rules  in  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy. 
In  its  critique  of  the  monetarist  doctrines  of  the 
currency  school,  which  contended  that note  overissue 
is  the  root  cause  of  domestic  inflation  and  specie 
drains,  the  banking  school  argued  as  follows: 
Overissue  is impossible  since  the  stock  of  notes  is 
determined  by the  needs  of trade  and cannot  exceed 
demand.  Therefore,  no  excess  supply  of  money 
exists  to  spill  over  into  the  goods  market  to  bid  up 
prices.  In  any  case,  causality  runs  from  real  activity 
and  prices  to money  rather  than  vice  versa.  Finally, 
specie  drains  stem  from  real  rather  than  monetary 
disturbances  and  occur  independently  of  domestic 
price  level  movements. 
These  arguments  severed  all but  one  of the  links 
in  the  currency  school’s  monetary  transmission 
mechanism  running  from  money  to prices  to the  trade 
balance,  thence  to  specie  flows  and  their  impact  on 
the  high-powered  monetary  base  and  finally  back 
again to money.  The  final link was broken  when  the 
banking  school  asserted  that  gold  flows  come  from 
idle hoards  (i.e.,  buffer  stocks  of specie  reserves)  and 
could  not  affect  the  volume  of money  in circulation. 
Falling  solely  on  the  hoards,  gold  drains  would  find 
their  monetary  effects  neutralized  (sterilized)  by the 
implied  fall in reserve-note  and reserve-deposit  ratios. 
To  ensure  that  these  hoards  would  be  sufficient  to 
accommodate  gold drains,  the  banking  school  recom- 
mended  that  the  Bank  of England  hold  larger metallic 
reserves.  With  regard  to  the  currency  school’s 
prescription  that  discretionary  policy  be replaced  by 
a fixed  rule,  the  banking  school  rejected  it  on  the 
grounds  that  rigid  rules  would  prevent  the  banking 
system  from  responding  to  the  needs  of  trade  and 
would  hamper  the  central  bank’s  power  to deal with 
financial  crises.  Finally,  the  banking  school  asserted 
the  impossibility  of  controlling  the  entire  stock  of 
money  and money  substitutes  through  the  bank  note 
component  alone  since  limitation  of  notes  would 
simply  induce  the  public  to  use  money  substitutes 
(deposits  and  bills  of  exchange)  instead.  In  other 
words,  the  total  circulation  is like  a balloon;  when 
squeezed  at one  end,  it expands  at the  other.  More 
generally,  the  banking  school  questioned  the  efficacy 
of  base  control  in  a  financial  system  that  could 
generate  an  endless  supply  of  money  substitutes. 
The  currency  school,  however,  rejected  this 
criticism  on the  grounds  that  the  volume  of deposits 
and  bills  was  rigidly  constrained  by  the  volume  of 
notes  and therefore  could  be controlled  through  notes 
alone.  In  short,  the  total  circulation  was  like  an  in- 
verted  pyramid  resting  on  a bank  note  base,  with 
variations  in the  base  inducing  equiproportional  vari- 
ations  in the  superstructure  of money  substitutes.  In 
counting  deposits  as part  of the  superstructure,  the 
currency  school  excluded  them  from  its concept  of 
money.  It did so on the  grounds  that  deposits,  unlike 
notes  and coin,  were  not  generally  acceptable  in final 
payments  during  financial  crises. 
Subsequent  Developments 
In retrospect,  the  currency  school  erred  in failing 
to  define  deposits  as  money  to  be  regulated  like 
notes.  This  failure  enabled  the  Bank  of England  to 
exercise  discretionary  control  over  a large  and grow- 
ing part  of the  money  stock,  contrary  to  the  inten- 
tions  of  the  school.  The  school  also  erred  in  not 
recognizing  the  need  for a lender  of last resort  to avert 
liquidity  panics  and  domestic  specie  drains.  With 
respect  to  specie  drains,  the  currency  school  re- 
fused  to distinguish  between  domestic  (internal)  and 
foreign  (external)  ones.  As  far  as  policy  was  con- 
cerned,  both  drains were  to be handled  the  same way, 
namely  by monetary  contraction.  By the  time  Walter 
Bagehot  wrote  his celebrated  Lombard  Street  in  1873, 
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required  different  treatment  and  that  the  surest  way 
to  arrest  an  internal  drain  was  through  a policy  of 
liberal  lending.  Such  drains  were  caused  by  panic- 
induced  demands  for high-powered  money  (gold and 
Bank  notes)  and  could  be  terminated  by  the  central 
bank’s announced  readiness  to satiate  those  demands. 
The  currency  school  nevertheless  remained  op- 
posed  to  such  a policy,  fearing  it  would  place  too 
much  discretionary  power  in the  hands  of  the  cen- 
tral bank.  These  shortcomings  in no way invalidated 
the  currency  school’s  contention  that  convertibility 
is an inadequate  safeguard  to overissue  and therefore 
must  be  reinforced  by  positive  regulation.  Nor  did 
they  undermine  its  monetary  theory  of  inflation, 
which  was  superior  to  any  explantion  its critics  had 
to  offer. 
As for  the  banking  school,  it rightly  stressed  the 
importance  of  checking  deposits  in  the  payments 
mechanism.  But  it  was  wrong  in  insisting  that  the 
real  bills  doctrine,  which  tied  note  issues  to  loans 
made  for  productive  purposes,  would  prevent  infla- 
tionary  money  growth.  The  currency  school  trium- 
phantly  exposed  this  flaw by pointing  out  that  rising 
prices  would  require  an ever-growing  volume  of loans 
just  to finance  the  same  level  of real  transactions.  In 
this  way  inflation  would  justify  the  monetary  expan- 
sion necessary  to sustain  it and the  real bills criterion 
would  fail to limit the  quantity  of money  in existence. 
Also,  by  the  1890s  Knut  Wicksell  had  rigorously 
demonstrated  the  same  point  made  by Henry  Thorn- 
ton  in  1802,  namely  that  an  insatiable  demand  for 
loans  results  when  the  loan  rate  of interest  is below 
the  expected  rate  of profit  on  capital.  In  such  cases 
the  real  bills  criterion  provides  no  bar  to  overissue. 
Despite  this  criticism  the  real  bills  doctrine  sur- 
vived  in banking  tradition  to be incorporated  as a key 
concept  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913.  And 
during the  German  hyperinflation  of 1922-23  the  doc- 
trine  formed  the  basis  of the  Reichsbank’s  policy  of 
issuing  astronomical  sums  of  money  to  satisfy  the 
needs  of trade  at ever-rising  prices.  Oblivious  to the 
Thornton-Wicksell  demonstration  that  the  real  bills 
test  provides  no check  to overissue  when  lenders  peg 
loan rates  below  the  going profit  rate,  the  Reichsbank 
insisted  on  pegging  its  discount  rate  at  12 percent 
(later  raised  to 90 percent)  at a time  when  the  going 
market  rate  of  interest  was  well  in  excess  of  7000 
percent  per  annum.  This  huge  differential  of course 
made  it  extremely  profitable  for  commercial  banks 
to  rediscount  bills  with  the  Reichsbank  and  to  loan 
out  the  proceeds,  thereby  producing  additional 
inflationary  expansion  of the  money  supply  and  fur- 
ther  upward  pressure  on  interest  rates.  The  authori- 
ties  failed  to perceive  this  inflationary  sequence  and 
did nothing  to stop  it. On  the  contrary,  they  saw their 
duty  as passively  supplying  on  demand  the  growing 
sums  of money  required  to mediate  real transactions 
at  skyrocketing  prices.  They  simply  refused  to 
believe  that  issuing  money  on  loan  against  genuine 
commercial  bills  could  have  an  inflationary  effect. 
After the  hyperinflation  debacle  of the  1920s,  bank- 
ing  school  doctrines  reappeared  in  renovated  form 
as part  of  the  Keynesian  revolution.  Keynes  in  his 
General Theory (1936)  stressed  the  banking  school’s 
notion  of money  entering  idle hoards  (liquidity  traps) 
rather  than  active  circulation.  He  also  stressed  the 
school’s  ideas  (1)  of variable  velocity  absorbing  the 
impact  of money-stock  changes  leaving  spending  and 
prices  unaffected,  (2)  of  real  rather  than  monetary 
causes  of cyclical  depressions,  and (3) of prices  deter- 
mined  by  autonomous  factor  costs.  And  in the  im- 
mediate  postwar  period,  Keynesians  developed  the 
notion  of cost-push  inflation  emanating  from  grow- 
ing  union  bargaining  strength,  business  monopoly 
power,  supply  shortages,  and  other  institutional 
forces  that  produce  autonomous  increases  in  labor 
and other  factor  costs.  Only  the  banking  school  ideas 
of unlimited  money  substitutes  and the  futility  of base 
control  were  missing.  And  these  were  provided  in 
the  famous  report  of  the  British  Radcliffe  Com- 
mittee  (1959).  Representing  the  apogee  of  post- 
Keynesian  skepticism  of the  relevancy  of the  quan- 
tity  theory,  the  Radcliffe  Report  concluded  that 
attempts  to control  inflation  by  limiting  the  stock  of 
a narrowly  defined  monetary  aggregate  would  merely 
induce  spenders  to turn  to money  substitutes  instead. 
Velocity  would  rise  to  offset  monetary  restriction, 
The  Debate  Goes  On 
Today  currency  school  doctrines  survive  in Fried- 
man’s  work  just  as banking  school  doctrines  appear 
in Kaldor’s writings.  When  Friedman  argues that  rules 
are  preferable  to  discretion,  that  inflation  is largely 
or  solely  the  result  of  excessive  monetary  growth, 
that  monetary  shocks  are a primary  cause  of cyclical 
swings, and that  the entire  stock  of money  and money 
substitutes  can  be  governed  by  control  of the  high- 
powered  monetary  base,  he  echoes  currency  school 
opinion. 
Likewise,  Kaldor  echoes  the  doctrines  of the  bank- 
ing  school.  The  school’s  cost-push  theory  informs 
his  view  of  inflation.  Inflation,  he  argues,  stems 
mainly  from  increasing  militancy  of trade  unions  and 
the  resulting  rise in unit  labor  costs  caused  by money 
wages  advancing  faster  than  labor-hour  produc- 
tivity.  The  banking  school’s  notion  of passive  money 
appears  in  his  statement  that  money  is a  demand- 
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banks  accommodate  loan demands  and central  banks 
acting  as lenders  of  last  resort  permissively  supply 
the  necessary  reserves.  The  school’s  law  of  reflux 
surfaces  in  his  declaration  that  because  money  is 
demand-determined  its  supply  can  never  exceed 
demand;  any oversupply  is extinguished  automatically 
as borrowers  return  it to  the  banks  to  pay  off costly 
loans.  Finally,  the  banking  school  notion  of a poten- 
tially unlimited  supply  of money  substitutes  underlies 
his belief  in the  futility  of base  control.  Like  the  bank- 
ing school,  he  argues  that  restriction  of the  monetary 
base  induces  offsetting  rises  in the  stock  of  money 
substitutes  thereby  thwarting  base  control. 
In  short,  Kaldor  emerges  as  the  intellectual  heir 
of the  banking  school  and  the  antibullionists  just  as 
Friedman  is the  heir  of the  currency  school  and  the 
bullionists.  It  follows  that  the  debate  between  the 
monetarists  and  antimonetarists  is  not  of  post- 
Keynesian  origin.  Rather  it  has  its  roots  in  policy 
controversies  going  back  to  the  era  of  classical 
monetary  thought. 
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